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Section 1 – Introduction  
It is a strong empirical regularity that countries ruled by coalitions composed of multiple political 
parties have frequently exhibited large public deficits.  As a consequence many authors have posited that 
coalition governments are associated with larger costs than single-party government.  Roubini and Sachs 
(1989), for example, state that: 
 
“When power is dispersed, either across branches of the government (as in the US), or across 
many political parties through the alteration of political control over time, the likelihood of inefficient 
budgetary policy is heightened. Thus we find that the size and persistence of budget deficits in 
industrial countries in the past decade is greatest where there have been divided government (e.g. multi-
party coalitions rather than majority-party government).”  
 
Under the norm of universalism, understood in terms of reciprocity of distributive programs 
among legislators, expenditures grow as the number of legislator and political parties increases.  In turn, 
the budget approved by a coalition is larger than the budget expected from a majority party in Congress 
(Weingast 1979; Shepsle and Weigast 1981).  Inman and Fitts (1990) for instance, demonstrate that 
when one party holds a majority of seats in the Chamber, the instability of the legislative process is 
reduced.  In multiparty legislatures as the effective number of party increases, coalitions become 
unstable and the size of the budget grows because the norm of universalism (Scartascine and Crain, 
2001).
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Proportional representation systems with large district magnitude tend to lead to multiparty 
political systems and coalition governments (Lijphart, 1994).  Electoral systems with proportional 
representation combined with large districts are more likely to produce weaker governments than 
plurality rule systems, because with a larger number of parties it is harder to ensue control of Congress 
(Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti, 1998).   
Several case studies related to Brazil follow these theoretical predictions. Barry Ames (2001), for 
instance, arguing about the origins of Brazil’s institutional and governability problems states that they 
stem from the high number of veto players especially as a consequence of the electoral system and 
federalism. For him, “rarely can the president avoid paying a high price, in pork and patronage, for 
legislative support.” Thus, coalition governments in Brazil should be associated with larger deficits. The 
political use of public resources in the form of patronage, clientelism, and patrimonialism increases, 
according to Mainwaring (1999), the costs of addressing popular preferences and achieving collective 
solutions in Brazilian politics. 
It is interesting that Brazil suffers from almost all institutional ‘pathologies’ that the literature has 
identified as increasing the cost of governing.  It has a presidential system; federalism; its electoral rules 
combine open-list with proportional representation; it has a multiparty system with weak political parties 
in the electoral arena; and it has been governed by an ample coalition in Congress.  One would expect all 
these elements together to generate, if not an ungovernable democracy, at least a very expensive one 
especially in terms of keeping the coalition united and disciplined.  In actual fact, however, the cost of 
governing in terms of budget expenditures has been very low compared with other spending. We argue 
in this paper that it has been relatively cheap for the Executive to keep its coalition united in Congress. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze one of the most important mechanisms that the Executive 
uses to negotiate with its coalition in Congress: the appropriation of the congressmen’s amendments to 
the annual budget.  The Brazilian budgetary process is described and modeled to show how its 
institutional rules provide the Executive with the means to control that process so as to achieve an 
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In the next section we review the current literature and develop an alternative theory that 
combines two institutional dimensions, electoral rules and presidential powers, to explain the working of 
the Brazilian political system. In section 3 we describe the main institutional rules that regulate and 
constrain the key political actors, and  in section 4 we develop a spatial model that shows how the 
budgetary rules affect the outcomes of the interaction between Congress and the Executive. Empirical 
evidence that the Executive has consistently used the appropriation of the annual budget as one of the 
most important tools to obtain support and governability from Congress is provided in section 5. In the 
last section we conclude emphasizing our most important findings. 
Section 2 – Theory 
Scholars who analyze the Brazilian political system tend to consider that it is expensive in terms 
of governability because they focus mainly on the incentives provided by the electoral and party systems 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Haggard 1995; Haggard and Kaufman 
1992; Ames 1995a, 1995b, 2001). These scholars sustain that those rules create obstacles for the 
Executive to approve its agenda, increasing the cost of governing. First of all, the presence of an open-
list and proportional representation allows the citizens to select candidates instead of parties. They can 
base their selections on candidates’ personal qualities, their activities, and personal records. This offers a 
strong incentive for candidates to develop direct links with his/her constituency groups rather than to 
mediate such relations through political parties. Thus, for those authors, the personification of the vote is 
highly influenced by the way that citizens elect their legislator. 
The origin of this argument or at least its modern interpretation lies in the work of Downs (1957) 
and Mayhew (1974) who emphasize the importance of elections as the factor that shapes the behavior of 
politicians. In Mayhew’s term, it is a “two-arena” model in which incentives in the first (electoral) arena 
shape behavior in the second (legislative) arena. Political parties are thus seen as a consequence of the 
need to fight and win elections. Therefore, parties in the legislature develop largely as a consequence of 
the functional value of parties at election time. The direct inference of this argument is that if candidates 
develop more personalistic and individual relations with their electoral bases, rather than mediate these 
relations through political parties, this diminishes the importance of party labels in the legislative arena 
once these candidates are elected (Cain et al. 1987).  
By contrast, a second group of authors studying Brazil (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000a, 2000b, 
1999, 1997, 1995; Pereira and Mueller 2000; Meneguello 1998) has strongly questioned this consensus. 
Rather than stress the decentralized effect of electoral rules, they emphasize the institutional rules and 
structures that organize the legislative process itself and the power held by the Executive. In other 
words, focus is put on the set of rules and internal procedures that define the level of centralization in 
terms of prerogatives of initiating the decision-making process (agenda setting), which can be held by 
the deputies or the parties and/or the Executive. These authors attempt to explain how institutional 
variables internal to the decision making process (the distribution of power inside Congress) and the 
institutional legislative powers held by the president (decree and veto powers, right to introduce new 
legislation, permission to request urgency time-limit to certain bills, discretionary power on the budget 
appropriation, etc.) work as key determinants of legislator behavior. 
Bowler (2000) refers to this second approach as a “one-arena” model because it considers the 
links between the legislative and electoral arenas as substantively weak. Indeed, the one-arena approach 
was a response to models that depict the legislature formed by entrepreneurial individuals that try to 
maximize electoral benefits without political parties able to constrain their behavior. Cox (1987) and 
Cox and McCubbins (1993) represent one of the earliest attempts to ‘bring the party back in’ to explain 
legislative behavior that is not motivated by benefits provided by the electoral connection, but by 
  2incentives within the legislative arena itself. For this perspective, political parties solve potential 
collective action problems within the legislature by providing an institutional structure that establishes 
policy and ensures compliance of individual legislators.   
Differently from these two main schools, we argue that the Brazilian political system can be 
characterized neither as a purely decentralized nor as a purely concentrated system. In fact, it combines 
elements of these two different and antagonistic forces. While some features such as electoral rules, a 
multiparty system, and federalism act towards decentralizing the political system, other features such as 
the internal rules of the decision-making process in Congress, the constitutional powers of the president, 
and his/her capacity to selectively distribute political and financial resources, act towards centralizing it. 
In fact, the electoral rules provide incentives for politicians to behave individually while the internal 
rules of the Congress, the president’s power to legislate, and the centralization of benefits by the 
president, render legislator behavior extremely dependent on loyalty to the party and presidential 
preferences. 
It is the result of the combination of electoral and presidential powers that will define the relative 
costs of the legislators’ voting behavior. Therefore, the combination of these two institutional forces 
provides incentives for both personal and party votes. On the one hand, in terms of the legislator’s 
selection, the deputy has incentives to behave personally. On the other, in terms of agenda-setting and 
presidential powers, the deputy has incentives to behave according to the party leader or, in the case of 
the Brazilian current majority coalition-based presidential system, according to the president’s interests. 
In this case, the dynamic equilibrium that is reached can change from one issue to another. It depends on 
the capacity of the president and his/her party leaders in offering the appropriate incentives - political 
and economic benefits – that provide the best electoral returns to individual legislators. This interaction 
of institutional rules is key for understanding how it is possible for weak political parties in the electoral 
arena to coexist with strong political parties inside Congress. Therefore, we claim that there is no 
contradiction in simultaneous partisan and individual behavior in the Brazilian political system. In fact, 
understanding one of these sets of incentives is essential to understanding the other. In other words, the 
legislators behave according to the party leaders’ indication so as to have access to benefits that will 
increase their individual chance of surviving politically.  
In this paper we develop this theory by focusing specifically on the role of legislators’ 
amendments to the budget, which is one of the important links between the centralizing internal rules of 
Congress and the decentralizing electoral incentives.
2 We will show that presidential powers over the 
budgetary process safeguard the Executive’s interest from being rolled in Congress and additionally give 
the president high levels of discretion over whether to appropriate or not the legislators’ amendments to 
the budget. This latter power is used strategically as a bargaining tool by the president to negotiate 
support within Congress. The legislators in the governmental coalition are content to play this game, 
amending the budget to benefit their constituencies and supporting the president so as to have those 
amendments appropriated.  This benefits the legislators because, given the decentralized incentives 
provided by the electoral rules, the pork taken home by means of the appropriated amendments 
significantly increases their electoral chances (Pereira and Rennó, 2002).  It also benefits the president 
because support in Congress is obtained at relatively low cost in terms of the budget. In order to 
substantiate these claims we next describe the Brazilian budgetary process (section 3), illustrate how 
those rules safeguard the Executive’s interest and allow strategic behavior (section 4), and provide 
supporting empirical evidence (section 5).  
Section 3 – The Brazilian Budgetary Process 
In this section we briefly describe how the governmental budget is formulated in Brazil, focusing 
on how it constrains and shapes the relative power of Congress and the Executive.
3  Historically the 
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where and how public resources were allocated with others where it did not wield any direct influence.  
Currently, even when legislators have an effective role, it is mostly limited to amending the bill so as to 
target their main electoral strongholds with local policies. 
For the purposes of this paper the main budgetary instrument is the Annual Budget Proposal 
(Proposta de Lei Orçamentária – PLO) where the Executive estimates the expected total revenue and 
fixes expenditures for the next fiscal year, detailing specific programs and activities that will be pursued.  
The President has to send the PLO by August 30 of the same year and the Congress has to amend and 
approve it by December 15.  This is done first in the Joint Committee for Planning, Public Budgets and 
Monitoring (Comissão Mista de Planos, Orçamentos Públicos e Fiscalização – CMPOF) and then by 
Congress as a whole.  The PLO is then sent back to the Executive to be enacted as law with or without 
vetoes.
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The Annual Budget Law (LOA) is made up of three different budgets: fiscal, social security, and 
investment.  The fiscal budget embodies revenues that will be collected by taxation as well as 
expenditures for all public administration, including legislature, judiciary, executive and foundations 
maintained by the state.  The social security budget corresponds to government action in three segments: 
health, pensions, and social aid.  Finally, the investment budget is responsible for the total amount of 
(non-fiscal) capital revenues that will be invested by public agencies.  As we will show this is an 
important component of the budget because most of the legislative involvement in the process occurs 
here through individual and collective amendments.  The congressmen’s participation therefore depends 
on the availability of total investment. 
It is relevant to note that even before the budgetary proposal is sent to Congress, some 
legislators, especially the top ranking ones, take advantage of their political networks inside Ministries 
and public agencies to include their demands and projects in the Executive’s proposal that will be sent to 
Congress.  In other words, these legislators can avoid a significant step of negotiation in Congress, since 
their demands are already included in the proposal sent by the president.  It is at this stage that the 
trickiest negotiations occur within the Executive branch itself, with each part trying to enlarge its own 
budget and the Treasury trying to hold back their demands. 
The involvement of legislators in the budgetary cycle occurs predominantly in the Joint 
Committee for Planning, Public Budgets and Monitoring – CMPOF.  Rocha (1997:108) compares the 
number of amendments approved by the CMPOF and by the Floor of Congress.  He points out that 
Congress does not substantially modify the report approved by the committee.  According to that author, 
the CMPOF is the main decision-making locus regarding the budget within Congress.  It is the largest 
committee of the Brazilian Congress, with 84 effective members and 84 substitutes, 63 of which are 
deputies and 21 senators.  The composition of the committee is based on the proportional number of 
seats that each political party holds in Congress.  Therefore the larger parties have greater representation 
within the committee.  According to the internal rules of Congress, party leaders are responsible for 
appointing committee members.  In addition party leaders have considerable influence over the yearly 
choice of the president of the committee and its three vice-presidents.  These hierarchical positions and 
that of rapporteur (who drafts the original proposals and subsequent revisions) are alternated each year 
between representatives of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies.  Given the importance of these 
positions, the prerogatives of the party leaders in shaping the committee constitute an important means 
for them to control the budgetary process as well as to reward and punish their members. 
The CMPOF is composed of thematic standing subcommittees with a maximum of seven 
legislators.  Each subcommittee has a sectoral rapporteur whose responsibility is to compile a partial 
report with the amendments approved by its members.  The CMPOF’s general rapporteur then 
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appointed by the president of the committee subject to the restriction that the appointments must follow 
party proportionality. 
When a bill reaches the CMPOF the general rapporteur submits a preliminary statement based 
on negotiation among party leaders.  One of the most important aspects of this preliminary report is the 
definition of parameters and deadlines for legislators to submit collective and individual amendments.  
This is why there is such fierce competition among legislators to become members of this committee, 
and especially to be appointed to high hierarchical positions, such as rapporteur or sub- rapporteur. 
These positions allow the legislators to propose resource reallocation, since the process of approving 
amendments is centralized on the rapporteur positions.  Furthermore, only committee members are 
allowed to headline legislators’ amendments during the voting process in the committee floor.
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Although legislators have the right to amend bills that are exclusively introduced by the 
president, there are several restrictions.  Congress may not authorize expenditures that exceeds the 
budgetary revenue and amendments must be compatible with a multi-annual plan proposed by the 
Executive.  Also amendments must be proposed by standing committees, regional blocs, state blocs, or 
individual legislators. Collective amendments have a greater probability of being approved as they have 
the direct support of more than one legislator.  However, the introduction of collective amendments does 
not mean that individual ones have faded out or lost importance. Agreements among local, state and 
national politicians to include individual amendments disguised as collective ones are not rare.  
Until 1993, there was no limit regarding the number of amendments that each legislator could 
make to the PLO.
6  After 1993 the number of amendments was restricted to fifty.  This was an attempt to 
rationalize the process by giving priority to collective amendments thus reducing the large number of 
disputes among legislators to ensure approval of their amendments.  In 1995, Resolution nº 2/95-CN 
further reduced the number of amendments to 20 and set a ceiling of R$ 1.5 million as the total amount 
of amendments per legislator.  Recently, legislators decided to increase the value of this quota to R$ 2 
millions.  
Resolution nº 2/95-CN also established new rules for collective amendments: 5 per standing 
committees; 5 per regional bloc; and 10 per state bloc. However, even with a limited number and value 
of amendments, legislators do not have any guarantee that their amendments will be approved by the 
committee; thus, they still have to negotiate with reporters and party leaders as many amendments are 
simply put aside. 
Another important institutional change introduced in 1995 was the decentralization of power 
within the CMPOF, giving more autonomy to subcommittee- rapporteurs vis-à-vis the general one that 
lost the prerogative to initiate the so-called rapporteur’s amendment (emenda de relator) and the right to 
reissue rejected amendments. It is worth noting that the distribution of power inside the committee and 
the subcommittees is not even and depends on the amount of resources available. Thus, subcommittees 
responsible for the definition of resource allocation in education, health, and infrastructure are extremely 
disputed.  Frequently legislators can count on the support of their Mayors and Governors to lobby for 
their demands within Congress. 
The changes in the committee’s rules toward decentralizing, empowering sub- rapporteurs and 
establishing limits on amendments had the purpose of reducing transaction costs and problems of 
collective action among legislators.  The idea was to redistribute power in order to allow more equal 
access to resources, thus increasing the chances of mutual approval of amendments via logrolling. 
Nevertheless, all these steps and the complex negotiations to approve amendments in Congress 
do not assure that a project once approved and not vetoed by the president will be in fact delivered.  It is 
the Executive that is responsible for budget appropriation, including the legislators’ demands.  Although 
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is entitled to determine which amendment will be appropriated, making the budget contingent to the 
amount of resources in the national treasury. 
The majority of legislators makes use of their prerogative to amend the budget to push through 
projects oriented to benefit their main electoral base of support.  That is, the process is used to realize 
pork barrel politics and maximize their future electoral and political careers. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to expect that the Executive, who has huge discretion in executing the annual budget, will take 
advantage of this power to try to affect legislators’ behavior. 
It is the absence of synchronization between tax collection and expenditure that has allowed the 
Executive to act strategically by making the appropriation of amendments contingent on the availability 
of resources.  As a result the Executive has had extreme flexibility and discretion when negotiating with 
legislators, and has not applied a homogeneous criterion when deciding which amendments to 
appropriate.  We will show evidence that Brazilian Presidents reward those legislators that consistently 
vote for their interests by executing their individual amendments to the budget and, at the same time, 
punish those who oppose by not executing their amendments. In addition, it is argued elsewhere that, 
ceteris paribus, the greater the amount of individual legislator amendments appropriated by the 
president, the higher will be the probability of that legislator’s re-election (Pereira and Rennó, 2002).  
In other words, with this institutional design it is not surprising to observe legislators who 
consistently give support to the Executive’s initiatives, aware of the effect this has on the probability of 
seeing their demands met by the president.  On the other hand, legislators who do not frequently follow 
the Executive’s preferences in Congress have less chances of delivering local polices to their 
constituents. 
One puzzle that this paper helps to address is why legislators have been content with such a 
small role in the budgetary process?  Why doesn’t a legislative majority try to achieve a better 
equilibrium in terms of access and decision to public resources?  The answer is that even this limited 
role provides high electoral payoffs, since the greater the amount of individual legislator amendments 
appropriated by the president, the higher will be the probability of legislator’s re-election (Pereira 2002; 
Pereira and Rennó, 2002). 
Section 4 – Executive and Legislative Interaction in the Budgetary Process 
  Having described the working of the budgetary process we can proceed to show how these rules 
allow for strategic action by the Executive.  The theory of the Brazilian political system presented in 
section 2 posited that the internal rules of Congress, of which the budgetary procedures are a subset, 
centralize power in the hands of the Executive allowing the means to greatly influence congressmen’s 
behavior.  By using a simple spatial model, this section illustrates how those rules safeguard the 
Executive from having its initial proposal disfigured by Congress and at the same time allows just the 
right type and number of amendments to be approved so to allow the exchange of support for 
appropriations that are so important for producing governability for the president and pork for the 
coalition members. Whereas the model focuses on the effects of the internal rules of Congress on the 
final budget, including amendments, that emerges from Congress, the next section will provide evidence 
that those exchanges do in fact take place. 
We start out with a very simplified scenario where the Executive has no power to prevent 
Congress from altering its budgetary proposal.  Under these unrealistic conditions the Executive has no 
recourse to stop Congress from changing the budget from his preferred point to some other point 
preferred by a majority in Congress.  Subsequently we give the Executive, step by step, a series of 
powers and examine how each of these allows him to safeguard his initial proposal from being altered 
by Congress.  Each of these safeguards represents actual rules and features of the Brazilian budgetary 
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changed against his will. 
To simplify assume that there are only two different policies for which the budget can be set, 
policy 1 and policy 2.  Assume additionally that there are three congressmen, A, B and C, with preferred 
points as shown in figure 1.  The figure has been drawn so that A prefers a higher level of policy 1, B a 
higher level of policy 2 and C a relatively low level of both.  This would be the case, for example, if 
policy 1 yields benefits mostly to A’s constituents and policy 2 to B’s constituents, with C being a fiscal 
conservative.  As described in the previous section the Executive has the prerogative to formulate the 
budget considering its estimates of total revenue and expenditures for the following fiscal year.  Suppose 
that the result of this procedure was a budget as represented by point Q0 in figure 1.  In order to show the 
preference of each congressman, the locus of points for which they are indifferent to point Q0 are shown.  
Points within each indifference curve are preferred to those in or beyond the curve.  We have chosen to 
draw these curves as ellipses so as to allow A to care more about policy 1 and B about policy 2.  The 
more elongated the ellipses, the more skewed are the preferences towards one of the policies.
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Let us abstract momentarily from the role of the committee in the process of amending the 
Executive’s budget proposal and assume that amendments are approved by a majority of Congress.  In 
figure 2 the indifference curves are truncated to show only the three petals composed of the set of points 
that command a majority against point Q0, that is, the win-set of point Q0 or W(Q0).  Not all points in 
W(Q0) are feasible, however.  The points in W(Q0) to which the budget can be amended depend on the 
rules of the budgetary process.  Assume for now that the initial level of expenditures set by the 
Executive cannot be increased, only relocated.  The line P is therefore a budget constraint that 
limits the points to which the initial budget can be amended.  This line has a slope of –1, indicating that 
to add one dollar to a given policy the same amount must be subtracted from the other policy.  All points 

























Figure 2 also depicts the contract curve between each pair of congressmen (dotted lines).  These 
lines show the locus of Pareto optimal points for each pair, that is, the points where there are no changes 
that can improve at least one of the two without harming the other.  If the indifference curves were 
perfect circles the contract curves would be straight lines.  The rounded shape of these curves is due to 
the elliptical preferences.  If any pair of congressmen formed a coalition to amend the budget, one would 
expect that they would chose a point within the petal formed by their indifference curves through Q0 that 
is also on their contract curve. 
  Given the configuration of preferences in figure 2, the Executive’s initial budget at Q0, and a 
constraint on creating new expenses, which amendments would we expect to be approved by Congress?  
Without any further institutions restricting the sequence of moves or establishing veto gates, we cannot 
make a single prediction that will pinpoint where the amendments will take the budget.  That is, under 
the current simplified setting there are not enough elements to guarantee a structure induced equilibrium 
to the budget amendment process (Shepsle and Weingast, 1981). Nevertheless we are able to make some 
predictions as to the set of points to where the budgeted can be amended.  This set of points should be 
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contract curves.  We would expect, therefore, that a point such as Q1 or Q2 would result from Congress’s 
amendment process.
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  Note that the amended budget can turn out quite different than the one sent to Congress by the 
Executive.  This means that under the setting that we are currently assuming, the Executive would risk 
being rolled by Congress in the budgetary proposal.  This outcome however is not in line with observed 
outcomes in Brazil, nor with the level of Executive preponderance in its relationship with Congress.  In 
what follows we introduce more realistic rules to the model for it to reflect more closely the actual 
budgetary process in the Brazilian Congress. 
I – Presidential veto – In actual fact the president is allowed to veto the budget proposal amended by 
Congress.  This veto can be for the entire proposal or only selected parts, which allows the president 
considerable control over the form of the final budget.  If there were no cost for the president to applying 
  8these vetoes, then the initial budget proposal from the Executive at Q0 would be the expected outcome.  
Congress would not even go through the trouble of amending the budget in the knowledge that these 
amendments would be vetoed.  The fact that budget is extensively amended without triggering vetoes 
suggests two possibilities.  The first is that although the amendments move the budget away from the 
Executive’s preferred point, the president may actually benefit from having the congressmen amend it, 
as the process of executing these amendments gives the Executive leverage to bargain with the 
congressmen.  This possibility will be further elaborated below.  The second reason that may restrain 
presidential vetoes is that there may be a cost for the president to veto the amendments.  This may be, 
for example, a political cost in terms of opposition aroused by the striking down something that is 
desired by a particular group.  Alternatively, in the case where a total veto is used it may be the costs 
that arise from having to start the budget procedure anew and risk starting the new fiscal year without a 
budget enacted.  The vetoing cost can be incorporated into the analysis as shown in figure 3, where a 
non-reversal set has been drawn around point Q0.  These are points where the Executive would want to 
veto the amendments but for which the cost of doing so are higher than the benefits of having the budget 
back at Q0.  Note that the way this set was drawn in figure 3 the amendments that moved the budget 
from Q0 to Q1 would be vetoed but not those that moved it to Q2.  














Non-reversal set for Q0
 
 
II – Soft constraints on budget amendments 
One important difference between the simplified scenario described above and the actual 
budgetary process in Brazil is the fact that the congressmen are allowed to make amendments that add 
new expenditures to the budget.  As was described in the previous section each congressman is allowed 
a certain number of amendments (currently 20) up to a specified total value (currently R$ 2 million).  
Figure 4 show the effect this change would have on the expected outcomes from the budgetary process.  
Whereas previously the final policy would have to be within the triangle defined by the  line 
through the initial proposal by the Executive, the possibility of adding new expenditure relaxes that 
restriction to a line such as  .  This would enable A and B to collude around some point within the 









0 to reach a point such as Q3.  If the volume of new 
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4, although it remains the case that 
there is still no telling whether the final outcome will be a point close to Q1, Q2 or Q4.  In any case the 
possibility of adding new expenditures to the budget exacerbates the danger to the Executive of having 
the initial proposal disfigured by Congress. 
























Casual observation indicates that Congress does impose several amendments to the budget each 
year, which suggests that points such as Q3 and Q4 may in fact be reached if in fact the Executive 
overestimates receipts.  However, rather than accepting that the Executive is being rolled by Congress, a 
different explanation will be provided below.  Once again, the fact that the Brazilian Executive has 
mechanisms to protect its interest in all other legislative proceedings leads us to expect that if points 
such as Q3 and Q4 are being reached then this outcome must be favorable to the Executive.  In order to 
understand how this can be the case we need first to describe two ways through which the Executive is 
able to allow the budget to be amended by Congress while still maintaining close control over the 
process so as to prevent any unwanted outcomes. 
III - Congressional budget committee (CMPOF)  
As was noted in section 2 the CMPOF is the locus within Congress where decision-making 
power over the budget is concentrated.  In particular some specific positions within the committee 
(president, vice-president, general rapporteur and sectoral rapporteur) are able to considerably 
influence outcomes in the budget amendment process.  Because the appointments to these positions are 
made by the party leaders, in proportion to the size of each party in Congress, the control over the 
budgetary process in Congress is actually held by the leaders of the parties in the government’s 
coalition, since they hold a comfortable majority of the seats. Under these conditions the result of the 
interaction between the congressmen to amend the budget will be subject to new restrictions.  Assuming 
that the committee’s powers allow it sufficient control over the process, we would not expect the 
amended budget to make the committee worse off than the Executive’s original proposal.  If we assume 
that congressman C in figure 4 holds the powers of the committee, then the amended budget would be 
expected to be closer to C’s preferred point than Q0.  That is, if A and B tried to amend the budget to a 
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outcomes that make the committee worse off than Q0 will only be observed if the committee willingly 
decided to allow this to happen, which it would only do if the losses in doing so were compensated by 
other means.  Below we will argue that this is in fact the case. 
IV – Restrictions over what policies can be amended by Congress -  
In the current institutional setting that we are examining the Executive has several means to 
assure control over the budget amending process in Congress.  Not only does the Executive have the 
exclusive right to establish the status quo by choosing Q0, but it can also guide the process in association 
with the majority coalition that controls the budget committee.  And if all else fails the Executive can 
veto the amendments in whole or in parts.  Nevertheless there are still further safeguards in the 
budgetary process that prevent the Executive’s proposal concerning the budget from being changed by 
Congress.  As was noted in the previous section most of the expenditures in the budget proposal are not 
subject to Congressional amendments.  These expenditures are set by the Executive and cannot be 
changed by Congress.  The budgetary rules are such that Congress only has the possibility of influencing 
the resources in the investment category, which typically accounts for only 1 to 3 % of all budgeted 
expenses.  This means that the congressmen actually have very little influence over the total budget.  
Not only is most of it beyond their reach to amend, but even that part which they can amend is closely 
controlled by the Executive. 
V - Strategic use of budget amendment appropriation 
Given that the budgetary rules allow the Executive such a high level of control over the process, 
it may seem odd that in actual fact a very high number of amendments are made to the budget by 
congressmen.  Even though these amendments can only target a very limited set of expenditures, they 
still represent important resources that one would expect the Executive to rather use according to his 
own preferences.  As we have been suggesting throughout this section, there are good reasons for the 
Executive to willingly allow the congressmen to amend the budget, even though this normally means 
having resources spend in a different way than the Executive would otherwise choose.  The reason for 
this is that the approval of the amendments is not really the final step in the budgetary process.  Even 
after the budget has been approved, including the amendments, the actual appropriation of the programs 
and projects in the budget is not guaranteed.  It is the Executive that is in charge of paying out the 
resources for the expenditures specified in the budget.  It so happens that in deciding when and how 
much of the resources will be paid, the Executive is allowed a very high degree of discretion.  This 
allows it to strategically make the choice of which congressmen’s amendments will actually be 
appropriated and which will be shelved despite having been approved.  Therefore it gives the Executive 
a very important instrument to reward and punish the congressmen according to the level of support or 
opposition they give to the Executive throughout the year.  Alston and Mueller (2000) modeled the 
interaction of the Brazilian Executive and its coalition in Congress and showed how the use of the power 
to strategically appropriate the congressmen’s amendments is an important currency that allows these 
actors to cooperate.  The appropriation of the amendments is one of the main ways through which the 
Executive is able to “purchase” support for its proposals.  By trading support for patronage, one of the 
main components of which is the appropriation of amendments, the Executive and its coalition have 
been able to reap the gains to trade in the legislative “market.”  This has been crucial to enable the 
Executive to approve several important reforms in the 1990’s.  It is therefore clear that the Executive has 
very good reasons to allow the congressmen to amend the budget.  The loss in terms of budgetary 
resources is more than compensated in terms of the support the Executive is able to obtain in exchange 
for the strategic appropriation of the amendments. 
  11The model presented above illustrates how the internal rules of Congress centralize powers for 
defining the budget in the hands of the Executive. The theory presented in section 2 posited that while 
this was the case within the legislative arena, the congressmen’s incentives in the electoral arena pushed 
them towards individualistic rather than party or coalition oriented behavior. These two sets of 
incentives in conjunction are key determinants of congressmen’s actual behavior. We argue that for the 
members of the ruling coalition, these incentives often make it an optimal strategy to support the 
Executive within Congress so as to reap the electoral benefits that accrue from appropriated 
amendments. In the next section we provide evidence that these exchanges do in fact take place. 
Section 5 – Strategic Use of Congressional Budget Amendments 
In order to present evidence that the Executive does strategically use the appropriation of budget 
amendments, a first test is done by comparing roll call data for each member of the Chamber of 
Deputies with the number of individual amendments that were in fact appropriated as a proportion of 
those proposed by the congressman and approved by the Congress.  The idea is to regress the proportion 
of appropriated amendments against a variable that measures how frequently the congressman voted as 
recommended by the Executive in the floor of the Chamber of Deputies.
9  By controlling for other 
variables that may influence the Executive’s decision to appropriate a given congressman’s 
amendments, we can test whether voting behavior influences that choice.  The estimation of this 
relationship through ordinary least squares would not yield consistent estimates since there are reasons 
to believe that the error of this regression is correlated to the voting variable.  Note that not only would 
one expect voting to affect the appropriation of the amendments, but also that a congressman that has 
had more amendments appropriated would, ceteris paribus, tend to vote more favorably to the 
Executive.  We therefore have two endogenous variables and consequently need to estimate a system of 
equations where both these variables are determined.  The system, which we estimate using an 
instrumental variable estimator, is: 
 
Appropriationi = β0 + β1 Votesi + β2 Number Amendmentsi + β3 Seniorityi + β4 Positioni+ εi  
 
Votesi = α0 + α1 Appropriationi + α2 Positioni + α3 Concentrationi + α4 Lefti +α4 Centeri + νi 
 
The variable Appropriationi is the percentage of all amendments proposed by a legislator and 
approved in Congress that the Executive actually appropriated.
10  Since a large number of the approved 
amendments are not appropriated, the Executive is rewarding those congressmen with a high rate of 
appropriation. The first right-hand side variable is Votesi, which measures the percentage of all votes by 
a congressman that coincided with the position of the Executive and which we are treating as 
endogenous. It can be seen as a measure of loyalty or support to the Executive.  A positive and 
significant coefficient for this variable would suggest that the Executive does in fact take into 
consideration the legislator’s voting behavior when deciding which amendments to appropriate. The first 
control variable in this equation is the number of amendments proposed by the legislator, Number 
Amendmentsi, given that those who present more amendments would have, cetris paribus, higher 
chances of having some amendments appropriated. The variable Seniorityi is the number of previous 
terms a congressman has served in Congress.  It is included in the first equation so as to control for the 
effect that experience and a reputation may have in helping to secure appropriation of one’s 
amendments.  The final variable in the first equation is Positioni, a dummy equal to one if congressman i 
was ever the president or vice-president of a permanent or a special committee.  The purpose of this 
variable is to control for the fact that congressmen who have what it takes to hold special positions 
within the legislative hierarchy may also be better at getting their amendments appropriated. 
  12The second equation has Votesi as the left-hand side variable and the key explanatory variable is 
Appropriationi.  If its coefficient is positive and significant we can conclude that the Executive can 
affect the voting behavior of the congressmen by strategically selecting which amendments to 
appropriate and which to shelve.  In order to control for other determinants of voting behavior we 
included Positioni, explained above, and Concentrationi, which measures the percentage of votes 
received by legislator i in the 1994 election in the municipality where the legislator got the most votes.
11  
This variable captures the effect of the direct influence the electoral constituencies have on the 
legislators’ pattern of voting inside Congress. It is commonly held that the greater the electoral 
concentration of a legislator, the closer he/she will be to the constituency. Therefore, he/she will have a 
greater difficulty voting according to the president’s interests, and a larger probability of voting in line 
with his/her constituency’s preferences. Finally we also control for the congressman’s party affiliation 
through dummy variables for parties in the left and in the center, with the right-wing parties being the 
left-out category.
12  These party dummies should control for a wide variety of legislator’s characteristics 
for which we do not have specific data. We chose not to add the party variable to the first equation, 
because we view the congressman’s party as affecting how he/she votes, and the voting behavior in turn 
affecting the number of amendments that are appropriated. Therefore, party membership does affect a 
legislator’s amendments, but does so indirectly by determining how he/she votes. That is consistent with 
our argument: the president rewards congressmen based on their loyalty and not on party membership.
13 
The regression results are given in Table 1.   
 
Table 1: Relationship between a Legislator’s Support for the Executive and the Proportion of the Legislator’s 
Amendments that are Appropriated (1995-1998) 
  Dep. Variable:  
Votes 
Dep. Variable:  
Appropriation 
Constant        43.60*** 
(2.79) 
      14.52*** 
(3.03) 
Appropriation        0.882*** 
(2.76) 
 
Votes           0.321*** 
(6.19) 




Concentration       0.179** 
(2.264) 
 
Left        -29.86*** 
(-6.32) 
 
Center  -1.74 
(-0.864) 
 
Number of Amendments    -0.163 
(-0.700) 
Seniority    0.038 
(0.52) 
R
2   0.28 0.10 
N  401 401 
Instrumental variables estimation   
t-stat. In parentheses; significance 1% ***, 5%**, 10% *   
Covariance matrix is White’s robust, heteroscedasticity corrected matrix (White 1980). 
 
In order to obtain consistent estimates, given the simultaneity between Votesi and Appropriationi, 
the estimation was done through instrumental variables, where the instruments were variables that 
should be correlated with the endogenous right-hand variable in each equation but not correlated with 
  13the error term.
14  The key results in the regressions are the positive and significant coefficients for the 
voting behavior variable and the amendment appropriation variable in each other’s equation.  These 
coefficients show that even when controlling for other variables that may affect the Executive’s decision 
whether to appropriate a congressman’s amendments, an increase in the congressman’s voting loyalty 
increases the probability that his/her amendments will be appropriated.  In the same manner, the higher 
the proportion of amendments that a congressman has appropriated, the more he/she will vote with the 
Executive.  Clearly the choice of amendment appropriation by the Executive and voting behavior by the 
congressmen is determined by more factors than those included in the regression, as shown by the 
relatively low R
2s.
 15  Nevertheless the results are consistent with the argument in this paper that the 
individual budget amendments are used as an incentive mechanism by the Executive, who exchanges 
them for support for his proposals in Congress. 
Concentration also presents a positive and statistically significant coefficient in the voting 
behavior equation.  It indicates that legislators, who received a more concentrated vote distribution in 
the previous election, exhibited a higher probability of voting according to presidential preferences. In 
other words, contrary to what was expected, legislators with more concentrated constituencies tended to 
be more supportive of the Executive’s position.  This result suggests that these legislators are more 
dependent on providing pork than those that have a more dispersed electorate.  As expected, the variable 
Left had a negative and significant coefficient, confirming that those legislators are more likely to vote 
against presidential preferences. 
Another important indication of the president’s influence over legislators’ behavior was the 
Cardoso government’s decision to centralize the Executive’s assets through the creation of a special 
System of Legislative Performance, called SIAL (Decree Nº 1.403, 21 February 1995). With this 
institutional change, the Cardoso government inaugurated a new and more efficient way of 
simultaneously controlling legislators’ demands and voting performance.  According to Eduardo Graeff, 
Executive Assistant of the Ministry of Political Issues 
 
“…At the beginning of the government, we had noted the absence of an institutional mechanism 
capable of controlling legislators’ demands. It was not unusual to see several legislators, many of them 
unfaithful to the government, requesting benefits from different government agencies and Ministries 
oriented to assist their electoral constituencies.  We decided, thus, to take upon ourselves the control of 
this situation centralizing all legislators’ demands at the SIAL.  This centralized system allows us to 
have a perfect picture of what legislators have requested as well as to what extent the Executive has 
really answered their demands.”
 16 
 
In other words, the SIAL works by balancing pressures between legislators’ demands and their 
voting behavior in Congress.  It helps to rationalize and control the Executive’s budget expenditure, 
decreasing the costs of bribing legislators to support the Executive by allowing it to answer the demands 
of faithful legislators while avoiding wasting resources on unfaithful ones. 
Therefore, legislators who usually worked through bureaucratic networks in different ministries 
to get access to public resources, now have to deal directly with the General Secretary of the Presidency 
who has complete information about what they want and about how they have behaved.  This new 
configuration further weakened the legislators’ ability to negotiate with the Executive, which 
strategically rewards faithful legislators especially in the last month of the fiscal year.  For instance, in 
the last four fiscal years more than 2/3 (66.8% in 1999; 66.04% in 2000; 74.11% in 2001; and 69.9% in 
2002) of the appropriation of total investments, were appropriated in December, most of them as a kind 
of left over (restos-a-pagar) that will actually delivered only in the next fiscal year. That is, the 
Executive’s strategy is to wait until the last moment to appropriate budget investments, including both 
  14individual and collective amendments, as a way of pressuring legislators to behave according to it’s 
preferences during the year. For other categories of the budget, which the legislators cannot amend, the 
government has a completely different pace of disbursement not concentrating them late in the year. 
Whereas the proportion of expenditures in the investment category that was concentrated in December 
was 43%, 67%, 66%, 74% and 70% in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively, the values for all 
categories aggregated was 12%, 26%, 11%, 13% and 15%. 
Despite all the institutional devices for enforcing its preferences, the Executive occasionally has 
to appropriate the legislators’ demands earlier in the year, either to deal with controversial roll calls or 
when it needs to block unwelcome opposition initiatives.  A good example happened in May 2000 when 
Congress attempted to increase the minimum wage beyond the preferred level of the Executive.  As we 
can see in the Graph 1, the peak of individual amendments appropriation (R$ 133 million) took place 
exactly in the month when this key issue was voted.  
 
Graph 1: Appropriation of 1999 and 2000 Budget Leftover 











Traditionally, it is on May 1
st that the government announces the new minimum wage. On this 
occasion, however, this discussion was anticipated to March because the Special Committee of 
Minimum Wage in the Chamber of Deputies, which was dominated by the Workers’ Party (PT), 
coalesced with the President of the Congress (and also the principal leader of the PFL, one of the main 
parties of the governing coalition), Senator Antônio Carlos Magalhães, to increase the minimum wage 
by 30%, to the equivalent of US$ 100, whereas the Executive proposed a maximum increase of 11.3%.  
When the President realized that he would lose this discussion in Congress he decided to pass it by 
Provisional Decree (MP) on March 23
rd, more than one month before the usual date.  
This decision was highly unpopular, as the government was negotiating an increase of 43% in 
the ceiling for the salaries of top public officials and judges. To aggravate this situation 2000 was an 
electoral year for municipalities, which implied high electoral costs for those legislators planning to run 
for mayor, to support the presidential proposal on the minimum wage. (According to the Estado de São 
Paulo 11/05/2001, 144 legislators had already announced their pre-candidacies for mayor).  As a MP 
has to be voted by Congress within 30 days (or to be reissued by the Executive) to become law, ACM 
and the opposition saw this as an excellent opportunity to override the MP in Congress. 
Under the threat of facing defeat (about 90 legislators of the presidential coalition had already 
signaled that they would vote against the presidential position), the government postponed the roll call 
on this issue so as to reconstruct its parliamentary base of support.  By maneuvering House rules and 
procedures, the government managed to reschedule this decision to May. In the meantime, to rebuild its 
congressional majority, the Executive had to satisfy legislators’ demands by disbursing resources 
  15through individual amendment appropriation.  On May 10 2001, the Executive finally triumphed in 
approving the MP on the minimum wage at its preferred level with a supermajority of 305 Deputies and 
48 Senators.  
A remarkable example of blocking unwelcome legislation occurred in May 2001 when the 
opposition attempted to establish a Congressional Inquiry Committee (CPI) to investigate corruption 
within the government. Since the beginning of 2001, the government followed its gradual pace of 
disbursement of the 2000 left over (see Graph 1 again).  In January, for instance, the level of 
appropriation was about R$ 500 thousand; in February increased to R$ 1.33 million; and in March 
reached approximately R$ 1.97 million.  In April, when the government realized there was a high risk of 
the CPI being established, it accelerated the speed of disbursement to about R$ 13.2 million. However, 
during the second week of May, after the main opposition party announced that they had finally reached 
the required number of signatures (171 Deputies and 27 Senators) to install the CPI on corruption, the 
disbursements jumped to more then R$ 90 million.   
Although this may have presented some political cost, it was very effective: 20 legislators 
belonging to political parties of the government’s coalition removed their signatures and the CPI was 
aborted. For instance, the day before withdrawing his name, Deputy Oliveira Filho (PL-PR) saw his 
individual amendment of R$ 80.000 oriented to benefit his main electoral base, the city of Floraí-PR, be 
fully appropriated. The same happened with Deputy Augusto Nardes’ (PPB-RS) amendment, which 
appropriated R$ 103.000 to his most important bailiwick; with Deputy Robério Araújo (PL-RR) who 
appropriated R$ 389.000 of his amendments; Deputy Eujácio Simões (PF-BA) R$ 82.000; Deputy 
Ursicino Queiroz (PFL-BA) with R$ 69.000; Deputy Luiz Moreira (PFL-BA) with R$ 260.000. 
However, the most effective legislator was the Deputy Luciano Bivar (PSL-PE) who conditioned the 
withdrawal of his name from the CPI to the appropriation of his budget amendment of R$ 1 million 
oriented to his main electoral stronghold, Jaboatão dos Guararapes (Folha de São Paulo, May 12, 2001). 
At first sight it may seem that the amount of money spent by the government to keep its coalition 
disciplined in these two occasions was very large.  However, comparing this to the total amount of 
resources that were allocated to investments it turns out that it is in fact only a very small fraction of that 
total.  The amount of resources in the amendments that have in fact been appropriated from 1998 to 
2002 make up less than 2% (in 2001 just above this level, 2.4%) of all government spending. The 
resources in the budget designated to pay and refinance debts, constitutional transfers to state and local 
municipalities, social security, and those related to operational costs of public agencies cannot be 
touched by Congress in the budgetary process.  Thus, the amount leftover to be designated to individual 
and collective legislators’ amendments is extremely low.  In other words, the legislative actions 
regarding the budgetary sphere are basically restricted by and reactive to the Executive’s initiatives.  As 
noted in the previous section these restrictions act as safeguards that ensure that Congress will not alter 
the Executive’s budgetary proposal in the most important issues. 
Furthermore, not all resources designated to investment are subject to legislators’ amendments. It 
is difficult to have a precise number on these amounts.  One of the main reasons is that some legislative 
amendments to the original budget proposal sent by the Executive have their appropriation aggregated.  
For instance, if a legislator approves an amendment of R$ 100 thousand in an original subproject of R$ 
15 million, its appropriation will appear aggregated as if the legislator had appropriated the total amount, 
not only the specific part that he/she in fact amended.  Likewise, the government can also take 
advantage of a project (amendment) made by a single legislator to reallocate resources by additional 
credits, and as in the previous example, its appropriation will be aggregated.  
In general terms, around 18 to 25% of the total allocated to investments are related to both 
collective and individual legislators’ amendments.  Since the adoption of the quota of R$ 1.500.000 per 
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senators and deputies, times 1.5 million).  According to the Committee of Finance and Control, the 
amount of resources allocated as collective amendments is about R$ 3.5 billion per year, of which 70% 
is devoted to investments. 
Further evidence of the strategic use of individual amendments is provided in by the pattern of 
appropriation of individual amendments by party during the second term of the Cardoso government 
(1999- 2002).  The legislators that belonged to the five political parties that make up the presidential 
coalition in Congress (PFL, PSDB, PMDB, PPB, and PTB) received on average 83.19% of the total 
public resources that were appropriated as individual amendments, whereas they held only 73.68% of 
the seats in the House. In other words, the governing coalition appropriated resources more than 
proportionately to their size in the Chamber of Deputies, while the opposition was under-rewarded. A 
striking example is the difference of appropriation between members of the PTB and the PT (the main 
opposition party, Worker’s Party). While the PT holds almost the double of seats (11.3%) than the PTB 
(6.0%) its legislators received less than those of the smaller party (5.8% versus 7.5%). This suggests that 
the Brazilian Executive takes into account both the size of the political parties in Congress and whether 
they belong to the presidential coalition. 
 
Section 6: Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed the budgetary process in Brazil and showed how it is under the close 
control of the Executive.  The rules are such that the Executive does not risk seeing its budgetary 
proposal disfigured by Congress.  Not only can the Executive veto any undesirable changes that 
Congress may inflict on its proposal, but also the Executive has a series of institutional instruments and 
informational advantages that allow it to safely guide the process through Congress.  As if that weren’t 
enough, the budgetary institutions further safeguard the Executive’s preferences by putting the most 
important parts of the budget out of the congressman’s reach, since they are only allowed to amend an 
astonishingly small part of the entire package. 
Despite this high level of control Congress nevertheless systematically proposes and approves a 
large number of amendments to the annual budget.  Even though the resources involved are few relative 
to the whole budget expenditure, it may seem surprising that the Executive, given the instruments at its 
disposal, would allow its proposal to be moved from its preferred position in such a manner.  We argue 
that the Executive is willing to suffer this cost because it gives rise to the opportunity to use the 
appropriation of the proposed amendments as a means to obtain support from the members of the 
coalition in day-to-day voting in Congress.  That is, the strategic use of amendment appropriations 
provide the Executive benefits in terms of support in Congress that more than compensate the loss of 
having its initial proposal altered.  This explains why the Executive not only doesn’t use its institutional 
and informational advantages to stop its proposal from being changed, but it even encourages the 
amendments by systematically overestimating the level of revenues that it expects to be available.  The 
congressmen are not fooled by this strategy but are willing to go along with this game since it provides 
means through which the majority coalition is able to coordinate to secure its own political benefits.  
The parties and the individual members of the coalition benefit by receiving budgetary resources that 
though small relative to the entire budget, significantly increases their probability of electoral success 
and political survival.   
Thus, rather than having the effect of leading to large public deficits the multi-party coalition 
based presidential government in Brazil provides an environment where the Executive achieves a high 
level of governability at a low cost. The series of institutional devices that allow the Executive to control 
the legislature and, in particular, the budgetary process, thus counterbalances the frailty of its electoral, 
  17party and federal systems, that are so often discussed in the literature as responsible for weakness of the 
political system and the source of low governability. 
Thus, despite the presence of a decentralized electoral system and a fragmented party system, the 
optimal legislative electoral strategy in Brazil has not been concentrated on personal votes, but rather on 
its opposite, the party vote. At first glance, this assertion seems paradoxical, given the premise that 
legislators are subject to electoral incentives to behave individually. Indeed, the majority of legislators 
vote according to their party leader’s indication (presidential preferences) in order to accumulate greater 
benefits in the Congressional and governmental arena and thus to strengthen their chance of political 
survival in the local sphere.  
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Endnotes 
 
* We are very grateful to Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Marcus Melo, Adam Przeworski, Ken Shepsle, Scott Morgenstern, 
Scott Desposato, Fernando Limongi, Daniel Palazzolo, and Lúcio Rennó for their comments and suggestions. 
1 Alesina Hausmann, Hommes, and Stein (1999: 255) found similar results for OECD countries. However, for these authors 
what define the size of the deficit are budget procedures. “More specifically, procedures which include constraints on the 
deficit and are more ‘hierarchical’ and transparent lead to a lower primary deficits. Hierarchical procedures are those that, for 
instance, limit the role of the legislature in expanding the size of the budget and the deficit, and attribute a strong role to a 
single individual (typically the Treasure Minister) in the budget negotiations within the government, limiting the prerogatives 
of the spending ministers.  
2 Although our analysis here is focused on the budgetary process, other scholars demonstrate positive and significant 
correlations between legislature support to presidential preferences and selective distribution of political assets controlled by 
party leaders and by the Executive. Amorim (2002), for instance, demonstrates that the allocation of cabinet posts is highly 
associated with party discipline in Brazil. Pereira (2002) also shows that the distribution of hierarchical legislature posts 
(Standing and Special committees, Directorate Table, etc.) follows legislators’ cooperation with the Executive.   
3 For a more detailed description of the Brazilian budgetary process see Sanches (1997), Serra (1994), and Bezerra (1999). 
4 In Brazil the executive can veto the budget proposal approved by Congress in parts or as a whole. 
5 The high level of competition among legislators to take part in the Joint Budget Committee has lead to frequent increases in 
the number of seats in the CMPOF.  In 1988 there were 60 effective members (45 deputies and 15 senators) and today there 
are 84 members (63 deputies and 21 senators).  According to Serra (1994), the increase of the number of seats within of the 
CMPOF was the way party leaders found to cope with different legislators’ pressures, as the mere presence in the committee 
significantly boosts the chances of approving amendments.  
6 In 1989, for instance, the number of individual amendments was 11.000; in 1990, 13.000; in 1991, 71.000; in 1992, 76.000; 
1993, 13.000; 1994, 23.000 (Rocha, 1997). 
7 If A cared only about policy one and B only for policy 2, their indifference curves would be vertical and horizontal lines 
respectively.  
8 It may seem odd in the example that the constraint is not binding for the final predicted budget configurations.  One would 
expect that all parties would agree to a different configuration where all could be made better off.  This is due to the specific 
preferred points that were chosen for each of the three congressmen.  In particular it is congressman C that causes the 
outcomes to be below the constraint.  In most cases one would expect most of the congressmen to have preferred points well 
above the constraint so that in all solutions it would be binding. 
9 In Brazil the Executive, via its leader in Congress, generally announces its position on a bill before it is voted on the floor. 
10 All the variables are constructed with data from the Brazilian Congress for the years of 1995 to 1998. 
11 Note that in Brazil a deputy’s district is the entire state. 
12 Our data are for 1995 to 1998 and therefore cover the first Cardoso term. This president lied to the right of all parties in 
Congress, except perhaps PFL, and had preferences sufficiently close to the five coalition parties and sufficiently far from the 
opposition parties on the left that the division of the dummy categories into Left, Center and Right are expected to lead to 
negative, ambiguous and positive impacts on voting loyalty respectively. 
13 In the same manner seniority enters the Appropriation but not the Votes equation, since it is a proxy for “knowing the 
ropes” in legislative proceedings and as such should increase the number of appropriated amendments but not systematically 
affect the pattern of votes. The concentration of votes (Concentration) on the other hand is included in the Votes but not the 
Appropriation equation. Whereas the electoral consequences of having a concentrated constituency is clear our argument 
provides no reason why the president would consider this fact when deciding on appropriations.  Once again the effect is 
indirect: concentration affects votes, which in turn affect appropriations. 
14 The following variables were used as instruments: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deputy entered the governmental 
coalition during the period, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deputy left the coalition, the number of times the deputy 
changed parties, a dummy equal to 1 if the deputy has held other elective office, a dummy equal to 1 if the deputy is of the 
same party as the governor of his state, and a dummy equal to 1 if the deputy is of the same coalition of the mayors from 
his/her main electoral stronghold. These two last variables try to capture the influence of regional and local political actors, 
who hold political resources such as public funds and jobs, on the legislators’ behavior.  
15 A reviewer noted that popularity of the president could have an important effect on congressmen’s voting behaviour, as it 
is less costly to support a popular president than an unpopular one. Unfortunately our data do not have a time dimension so 
we can’t differentiate for periods of different popularity. It is noteworthy that towards the end of his second term 
F.H.Cardoso presented lower levels of popularity and encountered more resistance from Congress. 
16 Interview realized at Eduardo Graeff’s office in Brasília on September 1997. 